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PER SE REASONABLE SUSPICION:
POLICE AUTHORITY TO STOP THOSE
WHO FLEE FROM ROAD CHECKPOINTS
SHAN PATEL
INTRODUCTION
Picture this scenario: It is closing time for bars and all the
customers are forced to leave. Rather than calling a taxi, an
intoxicated patron decides to take his chances and drive home. He
exits the parking lot and turns onto the road to his house. Suddenly
he sees traffic cones and flashing blue lights ahead—a sobriety
checkpoint. Panic hits the driver with full force as he contemplates
what to do. Then he launches into a plan of action. The driver makes
an abrupt, but legal, U-turn using a driveway and reverses direction
to avoid the checkpoint. He knows another way home that does not
require passing through the checkpoint. A police officer sees his
evasive action and pursues him. Should the officer be able to stop the
driver as he attempts to flee? Would it make a difference if the
intoxicated driver was actually smuggling illegal aliens or a convicted
felon? What if he was a terrorist with a bomb in his car?
This scenario is not far-fetched; many drivers have sought to
1
evade checkpoints. Courts, however, have disagreed over whether
law enforcement officials may stop the fleeing vehicles. This Note
investigates the legal issues surrounding the evasion of police
checkpoints and argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a
bright-line rule that allows police to stop vehicles that attempt to
evade checkpoints.2

Copyright © 2007 by Shan Patel.
1. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
2. Such a rule instructs states on how to read the Fourth Amendment. Of course, states
are free to reach different conclusions (that better protect individual liberties) based on their
own constitutions.
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In arguing for a bright-line rule, this Note considers three factors.
First, it looks at the effect that permitting individuals to avoid
checkpoints has on the rights of individuals who continue through the
checkpoint. In essence, this involves a discussion of the justifications
behind allowing checkpoints in the first instance. Second, it evaluates
the rights of the fleeing motorists—namely, whether there is
reasonable suspicion to stop them. Finally, it briefly addresses the
benefits of a bright-line rule, both in furthering the essential purpose
of the Fourth Amendment and in serving as a practical tool for law
enforcement.
Part I introduces the legal background, including both the legal
rationale for allowing checkpoints and whether reasonable suspicion
applies in the flight context. Part II illustrates the differing
conclusions courts have reached concerning whether vehicles can be
stopped solely for evading a checkpoint. Part III argues in favor of
per se reasonable suspicion for fleeing vehicles. The conclusion
briefly discusses the policy benefits that this bright-line rule would
create.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Reasonableness Standard
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the
exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .’”4 Courts evaluate the
reasonableness of a specific police practice by comparing the act’s
intrusion on the individual with the legitimate government interest it
5
serves. Generally, the government’s interest is measured against an
objective standard, such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion,

3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has extended federal protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ( “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”).
4. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)) (internal citation omitted).
5. Id. at 654.
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which sets the bar for when intrusion on the individual is permissible.
As a result, “[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”7 Such suspicion,
however, is not an irreducible requirement of the Fourth
8
Amendment, and there are limited instances in which the general
rule is not applied.9 Vehicular checkpoints, for example, are held to a
different standard.
1. Stopping a Vehicle Is a Seizure and Hence Must Be
Reasonable. The Court has held that “whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to [move] away, he has
‘seized’ that person.”10 By stopping a vehicle, an officer has effectively
restrained the driver’s ability to move freely, and thus such a stop is a
seizure.11 This is true even for limited stops in which an officer quickly
checks a driver’s identification and then allows the driver to depart.12
Thus, even a brief stop, whether carried out at a checkpoint or by a
roving patrol car, constitutes a seizure and therefore must be
reasonable to meet constitutional scrutiny.13 But checkpoint stops

6. Id. at 654–55.
7. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
8. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976).
9. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. For example, the Court has upheld “suspicionless searches”
when the search furthers “‘special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement’” and
when the search is limited and has a valid administrative purpose. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). The “special needs” rationale has been used to
justify drug testing programs. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664–65 (holding a school’s policy of
drug testing all student athletes to be reasonable and constitutional); Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (holding that a United States Customs Service
policy of drug testing employees seeking certain positions was reasonable). Administrative
searches often seek compliance with regulatory statutes. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 702 (1987) (upholding the search of a junkyard because it was a “closely regulated”
business) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding a health code constitutional if “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling”).
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
11. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 (“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute a ‘seizure’ . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief.”).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 653–54; see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556 (holding that checkpoint stops
are seizures).
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14
differ from roving patrol stops. A checkpoint seeks to stop all cars
passing through a fixed point, but a roving stop is made at the
discretion of a police officer who suspects that a specific car is
violating a law. As a result, roving patrol stops are subject to a
different reasonableness inquiry than checkpoint stops.15

2. Reasonable Suspicion Required for Roving Patrol Stops. The
traditional roving patrol stop only passes constitutional muster if the
officer had reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity [was] afoot.”16
This standard stems from the landmark 1968 decision in Terry v.
17
Ohio that upheld a police officer’s right to stop and frisk a suspect
even if the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect.18 In
Terry, an officer observed two men repeatedly peering in a store
window, which aroused his suspicion that they were casing the store.19
The officer approached the suspects, identified himself as a police
20
officer, and requested their names. After the suspects mumbled a
response, the officer patted down the exterior of their clothing and
removed two illegally concealed weapons from their overcoats.21 The
trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the officer
obtained the evidence in violation of the defendants’ Fourth
22
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment covers stopping
and frisking suspects, even if they are not arrested, because they have

14. Roving patrol stops are the traditional stops in which police officers turn on their lights
(or make other signals) to pull over a vehicle. This Note uses the terms “roving patrol stop” and
“discretionary stop” interchangeably.
15. Compare infra text accompanying notes 29–32, with text accompanying notes 56–61.
16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
original stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.”).
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 6–7.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 8.
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23
been seized as soon as they are prevented from walking away. But
the Court clarified that probable cause was not needed to justify a
stop that was based upon a patrol officer’s contemporaneous
24
observations. Rather, the reasonableness of the stop must be
determined by balancing the government’s need for the seizure with
the degree of its invasion.25 Police officers need to cite “specific and
26
articulable facts” that make an intrusion reasonable, allowing for an
objective determination of whether the facts would “warrant a man of
reasonable caution” to believe that the action was justified.27 The
Court stated that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity legitimizes
an initial stop, and if during that stop the officer becomes reasonably
suspicious that the suspect is armed and dangerous, a frisk of the
28
suspect’s outer clothing is constitutional.
29
Given that traffic stops, like pedestrian stops, are seizures, they
must be based upon probable cause or pass the objective
30
reasonableness balancing test created in Camara v. Municipal Court
31
and applied in Terry. Thus, in the absence of probable cause, officers
on roving patrol need specific articulable facts, or inferences from
32
such facts, that create suspicion of criminal activity. In analyzing
whether such suspicion existed, reviewing courts must look at all of
the circumstances of a given case to determine whether an officer had
a specific and objective basis for the discretionary stop.33 Although it

23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 20.
25. Id. at 20–21.
26. Id. at 21.
27. Id. at 21–22 (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 30. The Court applied the standard to the case at hand and decided that both the
initial stop and subsequent frisk were justified. Id. at 28.
29. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
30. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967).
31. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); see also United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”).
Warrantless searches need probable cause, which exists when the facts are such that a
reasonable man would believe that a crime is in progress or that one has been committed.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). The reasonable suspicion standard is different
in that it deals with the suspicion of criminal activity, whereas probable cause requires the belief
that such activity is occurring.
33. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
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is an objective test, the expertise and training of the officer is relevant
34
in evaluating reasonable suspicion.
Even when the government has a strong interest in suspicionless
roving patrol stops, the Supreme Court has refused to waive the
articulable suspicion requirement. In 1975, for example, the Court
refused to allow discretionary stops aimed at combating illegal
35
immigration in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. In that case, officers
stopped a vehicle because the passengers appeared to be Mexican and
the vehicle was traveling north near a closed Border Patrol
checkpoint in Southern California.36 The Border Patrol based its
argument for the stop’s justification on a statute that allowed the
Border Patrol to make suspicionless stops of vehicles within one
hundred miles of the border.37 In evaluating the constitutionality of
the statute, the Court again employed a balancing test, weighing the
38
interests of the government against the level of intrusion. Despite
finding that the interest in curbing illegal immigration was great and
the brief detention only created a modest intrusion, the Court held
that the roving stop was still unreasonable.39
The Court explained that smuggling activities, including human
trafficking, generally give rise to specific grounds for identifying
perpetrators, and hence, allowing officers to stop vehicles under a
standard of reasonable suspicion would adequately protect the
40
government’s interest. Second, the majority noted that there is a
huge amount of legal traffic within one hundred miles of the two
thousand-mile border.41 Suspicionless roving patrols allow officers to
use broad discretion to stop whomever they please and thus violate
42
the central tenet of the Fourth Amendment. In sum, although there
is a legitimate government interest and minimal intrusion to the
individual, suspicionless roving patrol stops are unreasonable due to
issues with their effectiveness and the unfettered police discretion
that they permit. Although the Court’s holding was fatal to
34. Id.
35. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
36. Id. at 875.
37. Id. at 877.
38. Id. at 878.
39. Id. at 879–80, 882.
40. Id. at 883; see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the reasonable suspicion standard).
41. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
42. Id. at 882; see also supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the essential
purpose of the Fourth Amendment).
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suspicionless roving patrol stops in the interior of the country, such
43
detentions sufficiently close to the border appear to be valid.
Four years later, the Court once again ruled against suspicionless
44
discretionary stops. In Delaware v. Prouse, a police officer, merely
because he was not preoccupied, stopped a vehicle to check the
45
driver’s license and registration. In evaluating the permissibility of
the stop, the Court again employed the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness balancing test: balancing the state’s interest in
upholding the stop with the level of intrusion suffered by the
individual.46 The Court admitted that the government had a valid
safety interest in ensuring that drivers and their vehicles had the
47
requisite qualifications to be on the road. But it also explained that
the intrusion of the temporary seizure on the individual was great,
because the stop could be inconvenient, waste time, and cause severe
anxiety for the driver.48
To determine whether a legitimate government interest justified
the intrusion, the Court looked at whether the discretionary stop was
a “sufficiently productive mechanism” to further the government’s
49
interests. In concluding that the stop was not productive, and thus
unreasonable, the Court evaluated alternative mechanisms for
50
enforcing vehicle safety regulations. It explained that the best way to
enforce vehicle safety regulations is to pull over vehicles that violated
51
traffic laws. There are countless legitimate vehicle stops every day at
which officers routinely request the driver’s license and registration.52
Without empirical data showing the effectiveness of suspicionless
stops, the Court believed that stopping observed violators is a more
effective approach because a violator is more likely than a random
law-abiding driver to lack a valid license or registration.53 Thus, the
marginal utility of the discretionary stops did not justify the intrusion

43. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The implication here is that 100 miles from the border
is not sufficiently close to the border to warrant suspicionless roving stops.
44. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
45. Id. at 650.
46. Id. at 654.
47. Id. at 658.
48. Id. at 657.
49. Id. at 659.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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54
to the individual. Furthermore, such stops allow unfettered
discretion by officers to act on hunches and are counter to the Fourth
Amendment’s central aim—limiting the discretion of government
55
officials to stop and search whomever they please.

3. Individualized Suspicion Not Needed for Fixed Road
Checkpoints. This Note has already mentioned that individualized
suspicion is not an irreducible constitutional requirement of a
legitimate stop.56 Fixed road checkpoints are an exception to the
traditional rule, in part because individuals do not have the same
57
expectation of privacy in vehicles as they do in their residences.
58
Moreover, a routine checkpoint does not usually involve a search. In
general, courts evaluate fixed checkpoint stops by balancing the
government’s interest in the stop with the level of intrusion imposed
on the individual.59 This evaluation includes an inquiry into both the
effectiveness of the practice (to see if it furthers the government’s
interests) and the extent to which police discretion is limited (to judge
the level of intrusion on the individual).60 In essence, if (1) the
government has a permissible interest, (2) the checkpoint furthers
that interest, and (3) the intrusion on the individual is slight, the
checkpoint stop is valid even without individualized suspicion.61
The modern debate over the constitutionality of road
checkpoints began as a result of the fight against illegal immigration.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,62 the defendants challenged the
constitutionality of permanent immigration checkpoints about sixty
54. Id. at 659, 661.
55. Id. at 661; see also supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the essential
purpose of the Fourth Amendment).
56. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
57. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). This on its own, however, is
not enough to defeat the need for articulable suspicion, because discretionary stops of vehicles
are not immune from that requirement. That said, there are differences between roving patrol
and checkpoint stops that alter the factors in the balancing test and allow checkpoint stops to
forgo individualized suspicion. (Fixed checkpoint stops, for example, stop everyone and thus
lower the relative intrusion on the driver.) See infra Part III.B.
58. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561.
59. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
60. See infra notes 61–97 and accompanying text (illustrating the balancing test in action).
61. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452, 455 (1990) (outlining the
reasonableness test that governs road checkpoints). But cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (refusing to suspend the requirement of individualized suspicion when the
checkpoint is used “for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes”).
62. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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63
miles north of the Mexican border. Applying its traditional
balancing test, the Court’s initial findings were similar to its
evaluation of the suspicionless roving patrol stops in Brignoni64
Ponce. The Martinez-Fuerte Court found that the government’s
interest in limiting illegal immigration was great and that it had great
difficulty policing the two thousand-mile U.S.-Mexican border.65 In
terms of the Fourth Amendment rights of the vehicles’ occupants, the
intrusion was limited, given that the stop was very brief—often
consisting of only one or two questions.66 However, even with these
findings, the Brignoni-Ponce Court had found the searches
unreasonable, due to the effectiveness of the reasonable suspicion
standard and the disdain for unfettered police discretion in roving
67
patrols. The Martinez-Fuerte Court, in contrast, decided that
permanent interior immigration checkpoints were reasonable due to
their effectiveness (vis-à-vis a reasonable suspicion standard) and the
limits they imposed on the discretion of government authorities.68
Regarding the effectiveness of suspicionless checkpoints, the
Court explained that they were vital tools for curbing illegal
immigration:

[Such a] program . . . is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens
cannot be controlled effectively at the border . . . . These
checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many
smugglers and illegal aliens . . . . And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled,
slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to
detection by roving patrols . . . . A requirement that stops on major
routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow
the particularized study of a given car . . . [and] such a requirement
would
largely
eliminate
any
deterrent
to . . . smuggling
69
operations . . . [on main] highways . . . .

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 545, 549, 550.
See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 557–58.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–83 (1975).
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557–59.
Id. at 556–57.
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Next, the Court explained that checkpoints grant less discretion to
70
law enforcement officers. Unlike suspicionless roving patrol stops,
routine checkpoints do not greatly interfere with legitimate traffic,
because motorists can always ascertain the location of fixed
checkpoints.71 In addition, permissible checkpoints should treat all
drivers objectively:
The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists,
that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public
interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers
in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions
as to the most effective [policy] . . . . [S]uch officials will be unlikely
to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
72
motorists as a class.

Note that in evaluating whether a search adequately limited law
enforcement discretion, the Court looked at whether drivers would
73
likely be caught off guard by the stop or fear that it is illegitimate.
Sobriety checkpoints have also been deemed permissible under
the Fourth Amendment. In Michigan Department of State Police v.
74
Sitz, state citizens challenged the constitutionality of Michigan’s
75
sobriety checkpoint program. In upholding the program, the Court
again employed the reasonableness balancing test by balancing the
government’s interest in eliminating drunk driving against the
intrusiveness of the stop, which it divided into objective and
subjective intrusions.76
Regarding the first prong of the balancing test, the Sitz majority
found that the government has a clear interest in reducing the
77
extensive damage and fatalities caused by drunk driving. To succeed,
however, the checkpoint has to promote that public interest
78
effectively. In evaluating effectiveness, the Court clarified that
elected officials, as opposed to courts, should determine which police

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 558–59.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 452, 455.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453–54.
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79
techniques should be used to combat a public threat. The Michigan
policy passed this effectiveness test because the legislative
determination to set up the checkpoint was backed by empirical
evidence showing that the proportion of arrests for drunk driving to
total drivers passing through the checkpoint was between 1 and 1.5
percent.80
In terms of the second prong of the balancing test, the Court
reiterated that the extremely brief nature of a checkpoint stop is a
slight intrusion to the individual.81 Calling this the objective intrusion,
the majority then proceeded to investigate the subjective intrusion,
which dealt with the fear and surprise experienced by law-abiding
82
drivers approaching the checkpoint. The Court described this
subjective intrusion as minimal, noting that stopped motorists can see
clear evidence both of the officials’ authority and that others have
been stopped.83 In addition, a checkpoint’s location is determined by
guidelines that limit the discretion of individual officers.84
In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
third type of road checkpoint: information-seeking stops that solicit
85
information regarding past crimes. Local police in Illinois set up a
highway roadblock to distribute flyers about a hit-and-run that
occurred a week earlier and to request public help in locating the
culprit.86 A motorist who was arrested for driving while intoxicated, in
part due to the presence of the checkpoint, challenged its
87
constitutionality. The Court held that the checkpoint met each part
of the reasonableness balancing test and thus was permissible.88 First,
there was grave public concern as a result of the crime, and the police

79. Id. at 454.
80. Id. at 455.
81. Id. at 451.
82. Id. at 452. Splitting the intrusion component into “objective” and “subjective”
components is akin to previous evaluations that first look at the actual intrusion created by a
stop and then evaluate the level of discretion given to officers. If the discretion is too broad, the
checkpoint is invalid in part because it can lead to arbitrary detentions and can scare and
surprise unsuspecting motorists. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882
(1975) (providing that broad discretion given to officials invalidates even brief seizures).
83. Sitz, 496 U.S at 453.
84. Id.
85. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422–23 (2004).
86. Id. at 422.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 427.
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89
needed help in finding the perpetrator. In addition, the timing of the
checkpoint effectively furthered the government’s interest; given that
the roadblock was set up in the vicinity of the accident and at around
the same time of day that the accident had occurred, it was reasonable
to believe that motorists in the area might have relevant
information.90 Second, the objective intrusion was minimal both
because the stop was brief and because the subjective intrusion was
equally limited given that the police stopped everyone and hence
there was no cause for anxiety among those detained.91
Vehicle document checkpoints are also likely constitutional,
though the Court has not directly addressed such checkpoints. The
Prouse Court stated that document checkpoints could be
constitutional if they somehow limited the discretion of law
enforcement officials.92 Specifically, the majority authorized the
93
questioning of all vehicles at a checkpoint as an alternative. A
document checkpoint of this type was implicitly upheld in a later case,
when narcotics found in plain view during a driver’s license
checkpoint were deemed admissible in court.94 In addition, the Prouse
majority clarified that truck weigh stations and inspection checkpoints
are legitimate even though they subject trucks to greater inspection
than other vehicles.95
Finally, in dicta, the Court has implicitly authorized the use of
road checkpoints in various areas in which the government’s interest
in the stop is very great. These include airports, government
buildings, and military bases—places “where the need for such
96
[searches] to ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”
Moreover, the “Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
93. Id.
94. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion).
95. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n.26.
96. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000); see also United States v. Green,
293 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he protection of the nation’s military installations from
acts of domestic or international terrorism is a unique endeavor, . . . [and] vehicles pose a special
risk” of delivering “car bombs.”).
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terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee
97
by way of a particular route.”
B. Evading Fixed Road Checkpoints and the Flight Doctrine
1. Defining “Evasion” at Fixed Road Checkpoints. It is difficult
to ascertain what exactly constitutes evasion of a fixed checkpoint.
After all, the act of evasion is heavily intertwined with the subjective
intent of the actor, and, as a result, it is nearly impossible to prove
conclusively that someone intended to avoid the police unless that
person confesses. Still, police can rely on common sense and
circumstantial evidence to determine when there is reasonable
suspicion that a driver sought to evade a checkpoint.98
Police have considered a broad range of driver activity to be
indicative of evasive behavior. Clear-cut examples of evasive
behavior include drivers who make U-turns or reverse direction at the
sight of a checkpoint.99 For example, a vehicle that suddenly stops and
backs away from a checkpoint is characteristic of evasion.100 Similarly,

97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. Although the Supreme Court has generally upheld road
checkpoints as reasonable stops, it found a highway checkpoint unconstitutional when its
primary goal was arresting motorists in possession of illicit narcotics. Id. at 34, 48. In Edmond,
the Court distinguished a narcotics checkpoint from other permissible checkpoints because the
drug checkpoint’s purpose was to advance “the general interest in crime control.” Id. at 44.
Immigration and sobriety checkpoints, in contrast, have the more specific purposes of “policing
the border” and “ensuring roadway safety,” respectively. Id. at 41. The Court explained that the
immigration concerns specific to the border and “vehicle-bound threat” of drunk drivers
justified roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. Id. at 43. Similarly, searches in airports and
government buildings are legitimate due to the “acute” threat present in those locales. Id. at 47–
48. The government’s general interest in controlling crime, however, is not specific enough to
warrant a suspension of individualized suspicion. Id. at 43–44. Allowing roadblocks for “general
crime control” would give law enforcement officials the power to utilize suspicionless
checkpoints for nearly any purpose, because there is always some “possibility that interrogation
and inspection may reveal” evidence that an individual has committed a crime. Id.
98. In fact, police always rely on such observations when making articulable suspicion
judgments. For example, they have the right to stop a criminal fleeing from a high-crime area
without conclusive knowledge that the individual committed a crime. See Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text.
99. The cases cited immediately infra at notes 100–05 are for illustrative purposes only.
That is, they provide examples of what police (at the local level) believed was evasive behavior.
In many cases, the courts overturned those decisions, either finding the behavior not clearly
evasive or finding an absence of reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle that avoided a
checkpoint. The latter finding is the crux of the issue that drives this Note. For further
discussion of how these cases were resolved, see infra Part II.B.
100. See State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Neb. 1997) (motorist stopped for putting
his car in reverse and backing away from a checkpoint).
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a driver who uses a driveway or parking lot to make a U-turn also
101
creates suspicion of evasive intent. In addition, police in Virginia
stopped a driver who drove through the parking lot of a gas station at
the corner of an intersection where a checkpoint had been set up,
under the rationale that he was trying to avoid the fixed stop.102 Police
at checkpoints have also stopped vehicles for less obvious evasive
behavior. Drivers have been questioned when they pull into
driveways or parking lots near checkpoints and simply park their
cars.103 In fact, in certain states, vehicles that make legal turns onto
other roads in sight of a checkpoint can be stopped under the
104
suspicion that they purposely made the turns to avoid the police. Of
course, police often use a combination of these evasive characteristics
105
to conclude that a driver is attempting to avoid a checkpoint.
Given that identifying evasive behavior remains a subjective
task, it is difficult to create an objective definition of what constitutes
such behavior. Unsurprisingly then, courts have differed on what
106
constitutes evading a checkpoint. Presumably, legal U-turns within
sight of a checkpoint raise reasonable suspicion of evasive behavior.

101. See Coffman v. State, 759 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (vehicle stopped for
pulling into and out of a driveway to make a U-turn); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 704
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (driver stopped for making a U-turn through a store’s parking lot);
Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (vehicle stopped for
making a U-turn through a semicircular driveway); see also infra notes 148–149 and
accompanying text.
102. Bass v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921, 922 (Va. 2000).
103. See Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 149, 151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (vehicle detained for
making a quick turn into a driveway); State v. D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 71 (Me. 1992) (vehicle
detained for turning into a driveway that an officer did not believe was the driver’s); People v.
Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1992) (vehicle stopped after it turned into a motel
parking lot).
104. See State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000) (holding that a vehicle that
makes a legal turn onto another road within sight of a checkpoint can be stopped by the police).
It is interesting to note that in this case, an officer had actually been instructed to patrol
secondary streets to ensure that vehicles did not try to make legal turns onto them. Id. at 922;
see also Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (vehicle stopped
for making a legal turn onto an unpaved road seventy-five to one hundred yards from a
checkpoint).
105. See, e.g., State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d 86, 86 (S.D. 1991) (police stopped a southbound
motorist who made a U-turn prior to a checkpoint and then utilized side streets to continue
back in a southern direction). Here, the driver did more than simply make a U-turn—in essence,
he made two U-turns to circumvent the checkpoint. Id.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 269–70 (2002) (vehicle stopped due to a number of suspicious circumstances, one of
which was the fact that it was on a road often used by smugglers to circumvent a fixed
checkpoint).
106. See generally infra Part II.A.
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Though many other behaviors may indicate attempted evasion, the
debate over which behaviors raise reasonable suspicions remains
outside the scope of this Note, given that much litigation revolves
around U-turns. In short, this Note seeks to determine how police
107
should respond to evasion regardless of its definition.
2. The Flight Doctrine and Reasonable Suspicion. The inquiry
at the heart of whether it is constitutionally permissible to stop a car
that evades a road checkpoint is whether the driver’s actions create
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. These circumstances are
analogous to an individual who flees at the mere sight of police. In
such cases, courts have generally found that unprovoked flight can be
one factor, but not the only one, in justifying a stop.108
109
In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court stated that when an
officer approaches an individual and seeks voluntary responses to
110
questions, the individual is not obligated to answer those questions.
111
In fact, the person may ignore the questions and walk away. In a
later case, the Court clarified that police need more than a mere

107. Because the issue of this Note is framed around otherwise “legal” evasive action upon
approaching a checkpoint, it is vital to emphasize that such action exists. On one end of the
spectrum is legal vehicular action that is so far removed from the checkpoint that it cannot
realistically be called evasive. For example, an automobile that makes a legal turn onto another
road a mile from a checkpoint hardly creates reasonable suspicion that it was evading the
checkpoint. At the other end of the spectrum are blatantly illegal U-turns (for example, over a
median) immediately in front of a checkpoint. Obviously, an illegal traffic maneuver to avoid a
checkpoint is irrelevant for this analysis, because such vehicles can be stopped for having
committed a traffic offense. See, e.g., ESPN.com News Services, Ex-Duke Star Redick Charged
With Drunken Driving, June 14, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/draft2006/news/story?id=
2482061 (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (discussing a college basketball star’s illegal U-turn prior to
a sobriety checkpoint). Significant middle ground exists between these extremes (for example,
legal U-turns), and those are the circumstances this Note seeks to address. It is unlikely that
police will render the issue moot by simply erecting roadblocks in areas where no legal U-turn
or turn onto another road can be made. First, this would essentially limit checkpoints to
highways and severely limit their effectiveness. They would be less random, and well-informed
drivers could easily avoid them by simply traveling on local roads. Moreover, a number of
routes, which are commonly used for drunk driving or smuggling, would be untouched by
checkpoint deterrence because they are local roads. Second, the numerous court cases that deal
with the legitimacy of stopping individuals who take legal actions to avoid checkpoints indicate
that this is far from a dead issue. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text.
108. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Search and Seizure: “Furtive” Movement or Gesture
As Justifying Police Search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581, 3–7 (2005) (referencing numerous authorities
regarding the role of flight, among other furtive gestures, in creating reasonable suspicion).
109. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
110. Id. at 497–98.
111. Id.
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112
refusal to cooperate to justify detention. Nevertheless, there is a
significant difference between refusing to answer an officer’s
questions and immediately fleeing when an officer comes into view.
Acknowledging this distinction, the Court specifically examined the
question of whether flight can give rise to reasonable suspicion in
Illinois v. Wardlow.113
In Wardlow, police were patrolling a section of Chicago known
for significant drug trafficking when the defendant, Wardlow, saw the
officers and fled.114 The police pursued and stopped Wardlow, and
during a protective pat-down they discovered a concealed handgun.115
In determining that reasonable suspicion supported the stop, the
Court distinguished these circumstances from Royer and its progeny:

[U]nprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.
Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact,
it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight
to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with
the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and
116
remain silent in the face of police questioning.

The Court stated that nervous and evasive behavior can contribute to
117
a finding of reasonable suspicion. In addition, it explained that
“[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of
evasion: [i]t is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
certainly suggestive of such.”118
Reasonable suspicion was not justified in this case solely because
119
of headlong flight. The location’s characteristics, specifically those
that made it a high-crime area, were also taken into account.120 Thus,
reasonable suspicion was justified in this case due to both Wardlow
fleeing at the sight of police and the location being a high-crime
area.121 The Court refused to establish a per se rule that fleeing the
police, without more, automatically gives rise to articulable

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
Id. at 121–22.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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122

suspicion. But the Court also rejected the opposite per se rule—that
a Terry stop can never be justified solely because a suspect fled at the
sight of police.123
By not providing a bright-line rule, the Court in Wardlow failed
to clarify the exact importance of fleeing in a reasonable suspicion
analysis and instead opted for a case-by-case analysis that evaluates
all of the circumstances.124 The Court, however, made three important
points regarding when fleeing gives rise to reasonable suspicion. First,
it reiterated that evasive behavior such as fleeing from police is one
factor to be considered in evaluating whether a stop is warranted.125
Second, it held that articulable suspicion was created when an
126
individual fled from police in a high-crime area. Third, it stated that
the mere fact that an individual could have purely innocent reasons
for appearing to flee police was not enough to negate reasonable
suspicion.127 Regarding this third point, the Court stated that even in
Terry the suspects who cased the store committed no unlawful act and
could have had innocent explanations for their behavior.128 But that
did not invalidate the stop:
In allowing . . . detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may
stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that
risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested
and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a
crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more
minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate
further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of
129
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.

Despite this holding, the specific circumstances in which flight from
police will justify reasonable suspicion are unclear (with the exception
of flight from a high-crime area). As a result, the circuit courts and
state courts remain split on whether unprovoked flight alone warrants

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 126.
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130
an investigatory stop. This difference of opinion has also manifested
itself in Supreme Court opinions.131

II. OPINIONS DIFFER AS TO WHETHER AVOIDING A CHECKPOINT
GIVES RISE TO A REASONABLE SUSPICION
Courts have differed over whether avoiding a checkpoint grants
officers per se reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist. Although
several state courts have failed to find per se suspicion, a few have
stated otherwise. Part of this uncertainty stems from the Supreme
Court’s silence on the issue.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of
whether attempting to evade a road checkpoint creates a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.132 The Court tangentially
referenced the issue in United States v. Arvizu.133 In that case, a roving
Border Patrol agent stopped a minivan north of the Mexican border
because of its numerous suspicious characteristics, including its
presence on a road that smugglers used to circumvent a fixed road
134
checkpoint. In upholding the constitutionality of the stop, the Court
130. Compare United States v. Jackson, 741 F.2d 223, 224 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding a Terry
stop constitutional when it was based on a suspect fleeing from police and yelling, “It’s the
police, man, run”), and United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that
flight from a lawful authority gives rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity), and Platt v.
State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226–27 (Ind. 1992) (holding that flight at the sight of police is suspicious
and authorizes an investigatory stop), and State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Wis. 1990)
(holding that flight in a car at the sight of police was sufficient to warrant a Terry stop), with
People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326–27 (Colo. 1989) (deciding that the act of running in the
opposite direction of companions at the sight of police did not give the officers an articulable
suspicion of criminal activity), and State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Neb. 1992) (holding that
a seizure is not justified when the cause of stop is based solely on the defendant’s effort to elude
the police), and State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 408 (N.J. 1994) (holding that the defendant’s
flight at the sight of police was not enough to justify his seizure).
131. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (Kennedy and Scalia, JJ.,
concurring) (“[T]he evidence should have been admitted, for respondent’s unprovoked flight
gave the police ample cause to stop him . . . . [But to admit the evidence, t]he Court instead
concentrates on the significance of the chase.”).
132. The Court upheld the conviction of a driver who was arrested after he drove through a
checkpoint without stopping, but ignoring the request of law enforcement officials to stop raises
different concerns than avoiding the officers altogether. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 448, 455 (1990); see also State v. Mitchell, 592 S.E.2d 543, 544, 546–47 (2004)
(upholding the conviction of a driver who drove through a checkpoint without stopping).
133. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
134. Id. at 269–70.
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stated that, when evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must look at
all of the circumstances to ensure that the officer had a specific
135
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. In looking at the
136
circumstances of the stop, location may prove determinative. For
example, “failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer
might well be unremarkable in one [place] (such as a busy San
Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote
portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”137 The Court cited the
commonsense inference that the driver was avoiding the checkpoint
as one of the circumstances that contributed to the reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity.138 Hence, although it did not address
whether the inference that a driver was avoiding a checkpoint would
independently give rise to reasonable suspicion, the Court found such
furtive action deserving of consideration in a totality of the
circumstances analysis.139
B. State Split
Although there is no disagreement that committing a traffic
violation to elude a road checkpoint creates cause to stop the
vehicle,140 there is significant disagreement among lower courts as to
whether evading a checkpoint without breaking any traffic laws
creates independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
A number of jurisdictions have held that avoiding or evading a
checkpoint is per se suspicious and thus warrants a stop. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, for example, explained that “the purpose of
any checkpoint . . . would be defeated if drivers had the option to
141
‘legally avoid,’ ignore or circumvent [a] checkpoint.” Thus, the
court found reasonable suspicion when a vehicle made an abrupt turn
135. Id. at 273.
136. Id. at 275–76.
137. Id. at 276.
138. Id. at 277.
139. Id. The Court also reiterated the Wardlow conclusion that a “determination [of]
reasonable suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Id.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
stop was justified due to an illegal U-turn made by a motorist); United States v. Jones, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding probable cause when a defendant violated traffic laws in
attempting to back away from a checkpoint); see also Commonwealth v. Frombach, 617 A.2d 15,
17, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding reasonable suspicion that a motorist was violating the
Vehicle Code when the driver made an abrupt turn without signaling prior to reaching a
checkpoint).
141. State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000).
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after passing a sign advertising an approaching sobriety checkpoint.
The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that pulling into a driveway
immediately before a checkpoint is an act of evasion that warrants an
143
investigatory stop. An Alabama court justified a Terry stop under a
similar rationale when a vehicle quickly turned into a driveway after
coming into view of a roadblock.144 In addition, an Arkansas court
upheld the stop of a vehicle that made a U-turn through a driveway as
it approached a checkpoint, even though the arresting officers
admitted that the stop was based only on the vehicle’s apparent
145
attempt to avoid the checkpoint and not any criminal activity.
The majority of courts, however, have refused to adopt a brightline rule that avoiding a checkpoint automatically gives rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In these jurisdictions,
avoidance is simply viewed as one factor in determining the existence
of reasonable suspicion.
Some courts employing this approach have concluded that stops
of motorists who avoid checkpoints are justified as long as other
146
factors contribute to the “totality” of the suspicion. For example, a
Kentucky court found reasonable suspicion based on a vehicle’s
evasive turn onto an unpaved road, the investigating officer’s prior
experience, and the time of day.147 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
came to a similar conclusion when a vehicle briefly paused as it
approached a checkpoint and then turned into a driveway in an
attempt to make a U-turn.148 In addition, some jurisdictions have
justified stops of vehicles that make U-turns prior to checkpoints, as
long as the training and experience of the specific officers involved

142. Id. at 922–24.
143. Boches v. State, 506 So. 2d 254, 256, 264 (Miss. 1987); see also Boyd v. State, 751 So. 2d
1050, 1051–52 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (finding reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle that had
made a legal turn to avoid a roadblock).
144. Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 149, 151–52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
145. Coffman v. State, 759 S.W.2d 573, 574–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).
146. Generally, these courts have implicitly, not explicitly, rejected the premise that
avoidance alone causes reasonable suspicion. See infra notes 147–149, 151 and accompanying
text.
147. Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 912, 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
148. Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); see also State v.
D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 71 (Me. 1992) (finding reasonable suspicion when suspects pulled into
driveway seventy-five yards before a checkpoint and the officer had “reason to believe that the
vehicle did not belong there”); People v. Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626–27 (App. Div. 1992)
(finding reasonable suspicion when a car stopped short of checkpoint, pulled into a motel
parking lot, and drove around without parking).
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149
Drawing an
convince them that the U-turns are suspicious.
150
interesting parallel to Wardlow, a Pennsylvania appellate court used
this logic to justify the stop of a vehicle that sought to avoid a
151
checkpoint in a “‘well-known’ drug trafficking area.”
A number of jurisdictions have explicitly concluded that a legal
traffic maneuver that results in a motorist avoiding a checkpoint does
152
not, on its own, constitute reasonable suspicion. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated that “there is no requirement that a driver go
through a roadblock[, and thus f]ailing to go through the roadblock in
and of itself . . . provides no basis for police intervention.”153 In
explaining its rationale for a similar conclusion, the Utah Court of
Appeals explained that the act of avoiding a checkpoint “merely
demonstrates a desire to avoid police confrontation . . . and at best
only gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may be afoot.”154
Along these lines, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that
circumventing a checkpoint by legally driving through the parking lot
of a gas station did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because
155
stopping such a vehicle would only be based on a hunch. Similarly,
an Ohio court found that legal turns made by vehicles approaching
checkpoints do not suffice to create the individualized suspicion
necessary for a stop.156 Some states, such as Pennsylvania, Maine,
Delaware, Utah, and Oregon have held that legal U-turns made prior
to checkpoints also do not give rise to the level of suspicion needed

149. Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961, 963, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Stroud v.
Commonwealth, 370 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); see also State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d
86, 86, 88 (S.D. 1991) (finding reasonable suspicion when a southbound motorist made a U-turn
prior to a checkpoint and then utilized side streets to continue back in a southern direction).
150. See supra note 113–123 and accompanying text.
151. Commonwealth v. Metz, 602 A.2d 1328, 1335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Although the Metz
court explicitly refused to adopt a per se rule, id., its justification (and justifications based solely
on the “training and experience” of officers) amounts to a per se rule, because all officers will
likely claim that their training or experience caused them to be suspicious of a vehicle evading a
checkpoint. In fact, on an intuitive level, most adults likely could cite their “life experience” in
concluding that people who avoid checkpoints have a potentially unlawful reasons for doing so.
152. See infra notes 153–159 and accompanying text.
153. Commonwealth v. Scavello, 734 A.2d 386, 388 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted).
154. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added).
155. Bass v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921, 922–23, 925 (Va. 2000); see also Jorgensen v.
State, 428 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an officer’s “intuition” that a driver
was avoiding a checkpoint by pulling into an apartment complex in which he did not live did not
justify the stop); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 704, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (holding no
grounds existed to stop a motorist who made a U-turn through the parking lot of a store).
156. State v. Bryson, 755 N.E.2d 964, 968–69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
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157
for an investigatory stop. The Nebraska Supreme Court went one
step further by invalidating the Terry stop of a motorist who, upon
seeing a sobriety checkpoint, put her car in reverse and backed into a
158
closed grocery store’s parking lot. The court explained that because
she was not cited for any traffic violations, the driver had been pulled
over solely due to her avoidance of the checkpoint, and thus the
159
officers lacked adequate suspicion to justify the seizure. Finally, the
Florida Highway Patrol has put out a police manual that explicitly
instructs officers that a driver’s effort to avoid a checkpoint is not
160
enough to warrant a stop absent other suspicious circumstances.

III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CREATING A BRIGHT-LINE RULE THAT
REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTS WHEN MOTORISTS EVADE ROAD
CHECKPOINTS
A bright-line rule that a vehicle that flees from a roadblock
necessarily arouses reasonable suspicion would be constitutional and
preferable to vaguer standards for three independent reasons. First,
allowing drivers to legally turn around at checkpoints undermines the
constitutional justification behind the checkpoints. Second, road
checkpoint evasions involve flight from police under circumstances
that should suffice to create reasonable suspicion under existing flight
doctrine. Finally, a bright-line rule will help limit police discretion and
thus further the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment.

157. See Howard v. Voshell, 621 A.2d 804, 807 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (no reasonable
suspicion when a U-turn was made legally before a checkpoint); State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306,
1307, 1308 (Me. 1991) (unreasonable for officer to believe that a U-turn made outside the
perimeter of a checkpoint was made to avoid the checkpoint); Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Div.
746 P.2d 716, 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stop after a legal U-turn invalid); Scavello, 734 A.2d at
387–88 (legal U-turn executed to avoid a checkpoint does not create reasonable suspicion);
Talbot, 792 P.2d at 495 (invalid stop of a vehicle that made a U-turn one-quarter of a mile
before a checkpoint).
158. State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1997).
159. Id. at 793.
160. FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, COMPREHENSIVE ROADSIDE SAFETY CHECKPOINTS, at
4 (Sept. 1, 1996), available at http://www.fhp.state.fl.us/html/Manuals/fh17-08.pdf; see also THE
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, THE USE OF SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS FOR IMPAIRED DRIVING ENFORCEMENT, at A-3 (Nov. 1990), available at
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/5000/5900/5919/checkpt.pdf (stating a driver’s intent to avoid a checkpoint
does not justify an officer stopping that driver).
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A. Allowing Motorists to Evade Checkpoints Undermines the
Justifications Behind Checkpoints
Checkpoints are justified by employing a reasonableness
balancing test that measures the government’s interest in the seizures
against the level of intrusion on the individual.161 In evaluating these
factors, courts look specifically at whether the checkpoint furthers the
government’s interest and whether the intrusion is limited with regard
to the level of discretion employed by individual officers.162 Allowing
individuals to evade checkpoints both undermines the effectiveness of
the checkpoints and increases the discretion of law enforcement
officials. The following “effectiveness” and “discretionary”
discussions relate to the constitutionality of the actual checkpoint, as
opposed to the permissibility of stopping the fleeing vehicles. Thus,
the evaluation focuses on the interests of the motorists who actually
go through the checkpoint, to whom the reasonableness standard
applies.
1. Ensuring Effectiveness. The Supreme Court has upheld
border and sobriety checkpoints, among others, partially because it
believed they were effective at protecting against illegal immigration
and drunk drivers.163 Conversely, the Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse
majorities invalidated suspicionless roving stops because there was no
evidence that they were any more effective than the existing law
enforcement mechanisms.164 As a result, suspicionless checkpoints are
only justified if they are effective in achieving the government’s
legitimate goals.
To reiterate the words of North Carolina’s highest court, “the
purpose of any checkpoint . . . would be defeated if drivers had the
option to ‘legally avoid,’ ignore or circumvent [a] checkpoint.”165
Intuitively, the individuals who are most likely to avoid a checkpoint
are the ones with something to hide. Imagine that all drivers have a
legal right to avoid a checkpoint and everyone realizes it. What type
of driver would most likely take advantage of this option?
Presumably, the answer is drivers who have something to hide. At the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra Part I.A.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
See supra Part I.A.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975).
State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000).

06__PATEL.DOC

1644

7/20/2007 1:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1621

sight of a checkpoint, the most rational decision for intoxicated
drivers, smugglers, and terrorists would be to turn around and flee.
As a result, the checkpoints would only process law-abiding citizens,
and the 0.12 to 1.5 percent of individuals screened at checkpoints who
166
are usually arrested would fall to zero.
This hypothetical illuminates two main problems with a system
that allows individuals to evade checkpoints. First, by not pursuing
motorists who have exhibited suspicious behavior, law enforcement
officers allow potentially dangerous individuals to continue roaming
the nation’s roads. In fact, the decreased deterrent effect of the
toothless checkpoints could increase the number of drunk drivers on
the roads. Perhaps worse, police may give up opportunities to catch
smugglers, terrorists, or other dangerous felons, who pose great risks
to the public at large. Second, the essential justification for the
checkpoint would no longer exist, because the checkpoint would no
longer serve any legitimate government interest, given that no one
would be caught. Thus, even the brief stop would become an
unreasonable seizure.
The most obvious flaw in this hypothetical is that many motorists
will not be aware of their right to turn around at the sight of a
checkpoint, and others may take a risk and attempt to fool
167
investigators. This argument, however, illustrates another problem
with letting knowledgeable citizens evade checkpoints: such a system
punishes ignorant and foolhardy criminals, yet allows more intelligent
perpetrators to drive away. Morally, this seems to be a dubious
168
standard on which to justify checkpoint searches. Practically, if the
Supreme Court announced that all drivers could make legal U-turns
within sight of a checkpoint without ramifications, the word would

166. Mich. Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). The Sitz Court compared the
typical 1 percent arrest rate at sobriety checkpoints (and 1.5 percent rate in that case) with
constitutionally accepted immigration checkpoints that had “success” rates of 0.12 percent of
vehicles (involving 0.5 percent of the total number of individuals passing through the
checkpoints). Id.
167. Another potential flaw is that police could potentially erect roadblocks in a way that
eliminates the possibility of legal U-turns. For a response to this critique, see the discussion
supra note 107.
168. In contrast, it should be noted that consent-based searches have been upheld regardless
of whether the individuals knew that they had the right to refuse the search. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding that the knowledge of the right to refuse a search
is not a prerequisite to a valid consent-based search). But see id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing a policy that encourages law enforcement to capitalize on the ignorance of suspects).
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spread fast—especially among the drunk drivers, smugglers, and
terrorists who would be most affected by the policy.
2. Limiting Discretion of Individual Law Enforcement Officers.
The second prong of the reasonableness test evaluates the degree to
which the checkpoint stop is an intrusion to the motorist. The
objective intrusion is small because the stop is brief. The subjective
intrusion, however, varies depending on the nature of the checkpoint.
The intrusion can be reduced by minimizing the checkpoint’s
psychological impact on the driver and minimizing the surprise and
fear that the stop causes. Permissible checkpoints sufficiently limit
police discretion by employing rigid guidelines and bright-line rules.
These limitations on discretion help reassure motorists that everyone
is being stopped and that they are not being singled out. This
minimizes surprise and fear, thereby limiting the subjective intrusion
of these stops.169
Allowing individuals to evade a roadblock raises legitimate
concerns regarding the subjective intrusion to those who enter the
checkpoint. The search might appear extremely discretionary to
confused motorists, as officials search individuals who pass through,
while letting others take evasive action and go free. Utilizing the
evasive action as a nondeterminative characteristic of reasonable
suspicion increases the potential confusion of unaware motorists. In
other words, because officers will consider evasive behavior as only
one factor in determining the validity of a Terry stop, officers will
170
stop some fleeing vehicles while allowing others to leave. Once
again, the reasons for this distinction will be unclear to many
motorists, and it may appear that the police are exercising unfettered
discretion.171
Subjective intrusions to individuals traveling through checkpoints
have more to do with perceived law enforcement discretion than the
realities of police practices. Individuals who are confused as to why
they are being stopped while others are free to leave may be
genuinely surprised and scared by the checkpoint. In reality, this
confusion will rarely occur because few drivers stopped at
checkpoints will know what happens to those who flee. Still, a bright-

169. See supra Part I.A.3.
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. This would be particularly confusing for motorists who follow another vehicle that
makes a U-turn and then wonder why they were pulled over and the other vehicle was not.
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line rule that guarantees that evasive vehicles will be stopped would
ensure the appearance of equal treatment of all motorists, thereby
minimizing the subjective intrusion on those who go through
checkpoints.
3. Addressing the Objection from Libertarians and Civil Rights
Advocates. Libertarians and civil rights advocates are likely to be
outraged by proposals that give government authorities more power
to intrude into the private lives of Americans.172 Their objections,
however, are better suited for opposing the fixed checkpoint in
general. Although this Note does not claim that checkpoints that stop
hundreds of drivers who have shown no suspicion of any wrongdoing
are desirable, it does seem likely that libertarians would oppose these
checkpoints. If such checkpoints are legitimate, however, it is
important to ensure that they are effective. Otherwise, the initial stop
at the checkpoint would be even more of an intrusion on the
individual, because it would serve little governmental purpose to
detain innocent drivers. Allowing officers to stop those fleeing
checkpoints ensures that those checkpoints do their job. In addition,
stopping all those who evade a checkpoint limits officers’ discretion
and guarantees that police treat everyone equally and do not
needlessly stop citizens.173 Hence, libertarians and civil rights
advocates should support this measure as it both increases the
effectiveness of the initial checkpoint and eliminates the unfettered
discretion of police officers.174

172. Libertarians generally support a society with as little government interference as
possible. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About the Libertarian Party,
http://www.lp.org/article_85.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (listing information from the
Libertarian National Committee). Civil rights advocates generally favor protections against
government intrusions into citizens’ private affairs. See, e.g., ACLU, About Us,
http://www.aclu.com/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (outlining the mission of a
prominent civil rights interest group). Libertarian and civil rights activists have yet to form a
public opinion on per se stops of motorists fleeing checkpoints. Hence, the libertarian and civil
rights “objection” is this Note’s own interpretation of how typical libertarian and civil rights
advocates might respond to its proposal.
173. To clarify, as long as the checkpoint is effective in catching some criminals, law
enforcement does not needlessly stop citizens, even if innocent drivers are stopped. Libertarians
and civil rights advocates may oppose checkpoints in the first place and thus oppose this entire
system. The point is, however, that once it is accepted that fixed road checkpoints are
legitimate, it is in their interest to embrace per se reasonable suspicion for those who flee.
174. Whether libertarians and civil rights advocates will support per se stops of fleeing
vehicles is another matter; this argument merely concludes that they should support them on a
theoretical level.
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B. The Flight Doctrine and Evading Checkpoints
Whereas the previous discussion evaluated the effect of allowing
some motorists to flee on the rights of those who continue through
the checkpoint,175 this Section examines the issue with respect to the
Fourth Amendment rights of those who flee. The two issues involve
different standards because the justification for stopping individuals
who evade checkpoints is reasonable suspicion, whereas no such
suspicion is needed at fixed checkpoint stops.
As a threshold matter, evading a checkpoint by making a U-turn
or turning off the road is a type of flight from lawful authority.
Admittedly, one can argue that evasive drivers are just exercising
their Royer right to refuse to answer an officer’s questions.176 But the
Wardlow Court explained that evading police is different from mere
refusal to cooperate: “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going about
one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”177 This holds true for
individuals who decide to turn around at the sight of a checkpoint.
Going about their business would entail continuing through the
roadblock. After all, they must have had some interest in the route
because they freely chose it. Moreover, unlike pedestrians, drivers
may have to take severe detours when attempting to circumvent
roadblocks, because their routes are limited to the roads available to
them.178 Thus, stopping individuals who flee from checkpoints is not
stopping individuals who are merely trying to go about their
business—the checkpoint has already interfered with their “business.”
In addition, it is important to remember that stopping fleeing
individuals does not change their Royer right to remain silent in the
face of questioning.179
The Arvizu Court explained that in evaluating indicia for
reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts must look at the totality of the
180
circumstances. One of these circumstances is driver action that
181
raises an inference that the driver is trying to avoid a checkpoint.

175. See supra Part III.A.
176. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
177. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
178. Pedestrians, conversely, have few limitations on where they can walk.
179. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
180. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
181. See id. (finding such an inference appropriate when a minivan was driving on a dirt
road often used by drug smugglers, and the driver refused to acknowledge the police officer,
slowed down at his approach, and appeared to instruct his children to wave).
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The Wardlow Court added that “flight . . . is the consummate act of
evasion: [i]t is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
182
certainly suggestive of such.” Even state courts arguing against a
bright-line rule agree that apparent evasive conduct by a driver
approaching a checkpoint should be considered when determining if
there are grounds for a Terry stop.183 Thus, there is little debate that
evasion gives rise to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
The question is whether evading a checkpoint is sufficient on its
own to pass a reasonable suspicion analysis. In looking at the totality
of the circumstances, location may prove determinative, as ignoring a
police officer may be routine in one setting but extremely out of the
184
ordinary in another. As a result, fleeing from a high-crime area is
enough on its own to constitute reasonable suspicion, as the flight in
conjunction with the location gives rise to individualized suspicion.185
Evading a checkpoint is no different. Unlike unprovoked flight at the
mere sight of the police, individuals know that they will actually be
stopped at a checkpoint. This emphasizes the inference that they have
something to hide if they flee. Just as the existence of a high-crime
area contributes to reasonable suspicion analysis in flight cases, the
presence of a checkpoint is an important factor in the current
scenario. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the evasive
action taken within sight of a checkpoint creates reasonable suspicion,
allowing officers to make a Terry stop.186
1. Addressing the Counterarguments.
The strongest
counterargument against stopping individuals who avoid checkpoints
is that they may have innocent reasons for taking evasive action. For
example, perhaps the driver is in a rush, thinks there is an accident
ahead, or merely forgot something at home. But the fact that an
individual could have purely innocent reasons for evasive action has
no bearing on reasonable suspicion.187 As long as an officer has

182. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
183. See supra notes 153–159.
184. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276.
185. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119.
186. It should be emphasized that flight often gives rise to reasonable suspicion. In fact, the
lower courts are split on whether unprovoked flight, on its own, is enough to constitute
reasonable suspicion (and two Supreme Court justices feel that it is). See supra note 131 and
accompanying text. Thus, it is far from a stretch to state that flight from a checkpoint should tip
the balance in favor of reasonable suspicion.
187. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
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articulable facts that lead to logical inferences of criminal activity, the
188
stop is justified. A Terry stop need not result in confirmed criminal
activity, because such a stop “accepts the risk that officers may stop
189
innocent people.” In fact, the Fourth Amendment allows this risk in
the context of more extreme seizures, such as arrests and detentions
based on probable cause.190 The risk of momentarily detaining
innocent drivers is especially permissible, given that individuals have
191
reduced expectations of privacy in their automobiles. Here, it is
important to emphasize that a Terry stop is a minimal intrusion, and if
an officer fails to find probable cause of criminal activity, the detained
person is quickly freed.192 Thus, even though there are innocent
reasons for avoiding a checkpoint, the minimal intrusion of stopping a
fleeing vehicle is justified by the articulable suspicion that evasive
behavior creates.
Libertarians may also posit that per se reasonable suspicion
impermissibly prevents a driver from taking any action that looks
evasive. For example, if within visual proximity of a checkpoint a
driver suddenly remembers leaving the stove on at home, the driver
will not be able to make a U-turn to return home. Such a critique,
however, is misguided. First, drivers consent to abide by state and
federal laws when they are on the road, and hence their vehicular
action is always limited. As a result, the driver responding to the small
crisis of the stove is already limited. The driver cannot speed home,
cannot make an illegal left turn even if it would make the trip quicker,
and must abide by numerous other traffic laws. Going through a
checkpoint or being stopped for evading that checkpoint is simply
193
akin to any other traffic regulation. Second, and more to the point,
this Note does not propose that a driver cannot make a U-turn in
visual proximity of a roadblock. Such action is not illegal, and drivers
will not be arrested for legally evasive actions. They can legally decide
to avoid the checkpoint, and the only consequence will be a brief,
nonthreatening investigatory stop. Once the officer determines that
there is no further suspicion of criminal wrongdoing that would justify

188. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
189. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126.
190. Id.
191. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
192. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119.
193. This relates to the issue of consent. When citizens engage in the privilege of driving on
government roads, they consent to the rules set forth by that government.
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194
a longer detention, the driver is free to go. Evasive action on its own
is not punished.

2. Bright-Line Rules Decrease Police Discretion and Meet the
Essential Purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, it is worth
noting that bright-line rules of criminal procedure help uphold the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment and have the practical benefit of
informing officers of exactly what they can and cannot do.
The Court has noted that “[t]he essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials, including law enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the
195
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .’”
Bright-line rules ensure that the government treats all citizens
equally. Complicated subjective judgments by officers, although
necessary in some cases, should be avoided when possible. In the
context of road checkpoint evasion, forcing officers to evaluate the
evasive nature in conjunction with other suspicious characteristics
gives officers significant leeway to make discretionary decisions
concerning whom they stop. In reality, officers can justify stopping
vehicles by simply explaining that, based on their experiences and
training, the evasion was suspicious. As a result, officers can pick and
choose which vehicles they stop and justify their actions based on
hard-to-review subjective criteria.
In addition, a bright-line rule has significant practical value.
Rather than having to engage in a complicated reasonable suspicion
analysis or to pore over countless court decisions, officers will know
they automatically have cause to stop evasive vehicles.196 As it has
done in other cases, a Supreme Court ruling instituting a bright-line

194. Again it is important to emphasize the limited and brief nature of a Terry stop. See
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (describing an investigatory stop as a minimal intrusion in which if an
officer finds no evidence of wrongdoing, the officer must let the individual go).
195. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978)) (citations omitted).
196. Admittedly, debate could still exist as to what constitutes evasion. Although this Note
addresses the issue in Part I.B., the Note’s main focus is addressing the threshold question as to
whether evasion (regardless of its definition) creates reasonable suspicion.
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standard would give officers in the field clear guidance about what
197
actions they may take.
CONCLUSION
Although this Note addresses the legal justifications for stopping
vehicles that evade checkpoints, the policy justifications are also
compelling. Simply put, the public has an interest in helping the
police catch criminals, especially those who are dangerous threats to
the public at large. Drunk drivers and fleeing felons, for example,
clearly pose a risk to those around them due to their propensities to
get into accidents and commit crimes. But the issue really crystallizes
in the context of potential terrorism, in which the victims could be
numerous. Especially in a global society in which suicide-attacks are
becoming more frequent, law enforcement officials must have the
tools to follow up on suspicious activity. Allowing terrorists with
bombs to escape easily by making U-turns at checkpoints also gives
them the opportunity to launch new attacks. As such, granting law
enforcement officials per se reasonable suspicion to stop those who
flee checkpoints would give officials a useful tool in the battle against
terrorism, drunk driving, and other crimes.

197. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (specifically limiting a protective frisk to a
suspect’s outer clothing); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (explicitly instructing
police as to what rights must be read to suspects).

